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N THE last analysis the crucial factor in the administration of criminal
justice is the calibre of the individuals who man the organization
and apply the procedure. Intelligent and honest effort may largely
compensate for the shortcomings of chaotic organization and archaic
procedure. But no procedural or administrative arrangements have yet
been devised whose purpose cannot be ruined by incompetent, venal,
or subservient officials in key positions. France with an admirable ad-
ministrative and judicial organization produced a Stavisky scandal which
shook the nation to its foundations. The lack of any structural unity
in its system has not prevented England from producing a brand of
judicial honesty which commands respect at home and abroad. The city
of Milwaukee, with a procedure and organization differing in no essential
respect from those in other American municipalities, is one of the few
bright spots in the dreary picture of law enforcement in America because
it has obtained consistently, over a period of years, honesty and intelli-
gence in its courts and prosecuting offices. The means which are taken
to secure honesty, capacity and independence on the bench and in the
prosecutor's office are thus of vital importance.
America has largely abandoned the inherited practice of leaving the
choice of the judiciary and prosecutors to the executive, in favor of popu-
lar election. That the attempt to place the election campaigns of these
officials on a higher level than those of other elective officials has not
been successful is evidenced by the fact that the periodic revelations of
incompetency and corruption in office extend to the judicial and the
prosecuting offices. When such scandals break, a cry goes up for a
return to the English method. Traditionally, the English leave the
appointment of judges to the executive authority and recruit them from
men who have made a success at the bar. The private career of the
appointee is sufficient test of his knowledge of the law. It is also an indi-
cation that he has had a wide variety of contacts from which he has
probably acquired that breadth of knowledge, and familiarity with the
social, economic, and financial currents of the day which are a valuable
part of any judge's equipment.
The Continent approaches the problem of manning the magistracy
(which includes the prosecutors) from quite another angle. In France,
Germany, and Italy, the bar and the magistracy are two separate pro-
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fessions; and judges are trained for their functions in much the same
manner that lawyers and doctors are trained for theirs. Following a
university and legal education a young man's capacities for judicial or
prosecutorial duties are tested by examination, and developed by appren-
ticeship. In contrast with the custom in England, where the executive is
bound by a minimum of formalities and legal provisions in making his
choice for any judicial post, the executive authority on the Continent
must observe a complex set of provisions, designed to open the ranks of
the judiciary to merit and close it to political influence. Once appointed,
an English judge seldom looks upon his position as a stepping stone to
a higher one. His appointment is usually the culmination of his career,
whether appointed county judge or Lord Chief Justice of England. But
on the Continent, since the magistracy is a career, the judges of the
higher ranks are recruited from those of the lower, and these movements
within the judiciary and the prosecutorial offices are, like entrance to it,
hedged about with complicated regulations.
Certain factors in the judicial organization complicate judicial and
prosecutorial careers in Europe. In the first place, in contrast to Eng-
land and America, all courts in France, Germany, and Italy, except the
petty courts, are collegial. The Europeans feel that the participation
of several judges in a decision gives greater guarantee of its soundness.
Trial courts of general jurisdiction function with three judges; appellate
courts, with at least the same number. In the second place, European
courts are sedentary. Neither France, Germany nor Italy follows the
English practice of holding assizes by a limited number of circuit judges
sent out from a central court at stated periods. To bring justice to the
door of the litigant, large numbers of inferior courts and trial courts of
general jurisdiction are provided.' Even the limited number of appeal
courts are regional so that the suitor has no great distance to travel.
Only in those cases which come up before the supreme court of the land,
must the litigant make the trip to the capital. Thirdly, none of these
countries have an institution similar to the English justices of the peace,
the non-professional unpaid laymen, who, with or without a jury, dispose
of the bulk of criminal cases and permit a limited number of professional
1. A recent French decree attempts to cut down the number of judges required by the
local trial courts of general jurisdiction. Instead of maintaining a full complement of
at least three judges for each court as heretofore, it is now provided that only one judge
shall be permanently stationed in specific courts which have little judicial busineis. On
the days when cases are to be tried, additional judges may be obtained from the neigh-
boring court. See (1934) LEs Lois NoUvLLEs 331 et seq. A similar deAre to reduce
the number of judges necessary is evident in the recent decree cutting down the number of
judges necessary for decisions in the Court of Appeal from five to three. Decree of June 25,
1934, (1934) LEs Lois Nou rLT.s 543-545.
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magistrates to judge the rest. In France, Germany and Italy a profes-
sional magistrate participates in the judgment of all cases from the
pettiest offenses to the gravest crimes. Fourthly, qualified magistrates
are required not only to perform judicial functions, but also to act as
investigating magistrates and as prosecutors. In none of the three
countries is there any difference in qualification or career between the
prosecutors and the members of the judiciary.
The collegial and sedentary character of the courts, the lack of lay
magistrates, the requirements of qualified judges as prosecutors, the ex-
tensiveness of their functions, and the need for investigating magistrates,
make necessary for European judicial organization a more numerous
personnel than is required by either the English or the American system.
New York, a state of about 10,000,000 people, has about 450 paid judges.
England, a country of about 40,000,000 people, has about 175.2 Ger-
many, a country of 65,000,000 people, has about 12,000 magistrates.0
France has a population of about 42,000,000 and about 5,400 magis-
trates.' Italy, with about the same population as France, has about 4,300
magistrates.' A European country, then, has a small army of magis-
trates to recruit. Competent young men must be attracted to the judi-
cial career to fill the lower posts. Many of them must be capable of
developing sufficiently to be entrusted with the higher positions, which
carry with them not only the responsibility for decisions in more import-
ant cases but also important administrative duties.
The Recruiting and Training of Magistrates
The most elaborate system of regulating the choice and training of
candidates for the magistracy is found in Germany, where apprentice-
ship preceded and followed by success in examinations is necessary to
qualify for appointment. To be eligible for the first examination the
candidate must have completed a three year course of legal studies in a
university. In Prussia the examination consists of a piece of legal re-
search on some assigned subject to be completed within six weeks, four
separate written examinations, and an oral examination covering most
of the fields of the law.
If the candidate passes this series of examinations he is named a
"Referendar."' He must then serve an apprenticeship of three years de-
signed to give him practical training in all the different branches of the
2. However, some of the functions performed by judges on the Continent, are per-
formed in England by justices of the peace and by court clerks with a legal training.
3. Sc=ERa, DiE DzuTscHE JusnZ (1928) 113.
4. See (1931) Am unm STATiSTiQuE 81.
5. 1930 RACCoLTA Umc AE D.LLz LEE 11, 1621-1622.
6. PRzussiscHn GEnicHTSVERxASSUNG (1926) 135 et seq.
[Vol. 44
CAREER OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS
law. In Prussia the apprenticeship is divided into six periods of six
months each, passed as attach6s to the inferior and superior courts and to
the prosecuting attorney's office. One six months' period may, in the
discretion of the "Referendar," be spent in a lawyer's or notary's (Notar)
office.' The present regime has also added a number of months' service
in a labor camp. If the "Referendar's" conduct is unsatisfactory or if
he does not make sufficient progress in his work he may be disciplined
or discharged from the service by the Minister of Justice. His work is
unpaid, as a rule, but a limited number of "Referendare" who are in
straitened circumstances and whose work is commendable may receive
small sums for maintenance.
Upon the termination of his apprenticeship the "referendar" may peti.
tion the president of the court of appeal (Oberlandesgerichtspr'isident),
for admission to the second examination (Grosse Staatspriifung). The
latter, upon satisfying himself that the applicant has completed his ap-
prenticeship, may propose him, but the ultimate decision rests with the
Minister of Justice. The examination, practical in character, intended
to determine whether the candidate can be successfully entrusted with an
independent post in the administration of justice, usually begins with a
piece of legal research.' The applicant is then compelled to work out
a number of practical cases and he finally must undergo an oral examina-
tion.9 A candidate who fails may be reexamined only once and then only
after a further period of apprenticeship. Successful candidates are
named "Gerichtsassessoren."
Not all "Gerichtsassessoren" become judges. Many become lawyers;
for admission to the bar requires success in the same examinations and
the same apprenticeship as appointment to the judiciary. Others of the
"Gerichtsassessoren" enter the public administrations, and some go into
private undertakings. "Gerichtsassessoren" who wish to become judges
are assigned by the Minister of Justice to an "Amtsgericht" or to a prose-
cuting attorney's office. Here, also, as during their apprenticeship, they
are usually unpaid. But they may be named to posts as substitute judges
in the lower courts (Hilfsrichter), or to temporary posts in the prosecut-
ing attorney's office. In these cases the "Gerichtsassessor" is remuner-
ated for the time that he actually renders service. In such temporary
positions a "Gerichtsassessor" usually passes a number of years before
he is finally named to his first permanent job in one of the lower courts
or in a prosecuting attorney's office. Permanent judges who have been
7. See Schwister, Ober den Stand der Ausbildung unserer jungen Juristen (Deutscland,
1932) 24 DEUTSCnE RiaxHzfuxO 3-8.
8. In its place the candidate may present a piece of legal re-earch completed during hi
apprenticeship.
9. Paaussxscnn Gmauc-svnarAssu= (1926) 138.
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appointed in the last three years have served an average of six and
one-half years as "Gerichtsassessoren."
Italy and France recruit their magistrates by methods similar to those
used in Germany. 10 To qualify as a magistrate success in examinations
and apprenticeship is necessary. But neither in Italy nor in Fance
are the conditions so rigorous or the preparation so thorough as in Ger-
many. In Italy the candidate must have three years of legal studies at
a university and pass a competitive written and oral examination pre-
pared and marked by a commission of magistrates, lawyers and law
professors named by the Minister of Justice." Normally the successful
10. In France and Italy petty court judges are not recruited by the same methods and
do not form part of the same judicial hierarchy as the ordinary magistrates. They will
not be considered in the above discussion. Formerly Italy, like Germany, opposed no
barrier to the promotion of judges in the petty to the superior courts. A position in the
petty court (pretore) was the first stage in the judicial career. In 1930 a law changed
this system, organizing the career of the petty judges on a different basis than the judges
in the superior court, thus going back to a system which existed in Italy before 1890.
See law of April 17, 1930, n. 421 and observations on the prior system by former Minister
of Justice Rocco in 1 LAvoRI PREPARATORI DEL CODICE PENALE E DEL CODICE DI PROCEDUVA
PENALE (1928) 29. By the terms of this law a graduate in law may take a competitive
examination for admission as a judge to the pretorial court. If successful in the examina-
tion, he is named "uditore," and must serve an apprenticeship in these courts. After six
months of apprenticeship he may be named "uditore vice pretore" with full powers and
is destined to supplement the pretore in the exercise of their functions. After eighteen
months' apprenticeship, the candidate may be named "pretore aggiunto" If he passes a
theoretical and practical examination. The "pretore aggiunto" may be nominated titulary
pretore, after three years of service, on the basis of a judgment as to his merits given by
a promotion commission (consiglio giudiziario) attached to the Court of Appeal. A
"pretore" may after nineteen years' service be considered for promotion to the Court of
Appeal. Such a promotion would make him a member of the superior magistracy.
The French distinction between the methods of recruiting the magistrates for the
tribunaux de paix and for the courts of first instance and appellate courts goes back to
the French Revolution. To be named juge de paix one must be at least twenty-seven
years old, have a diploma attesting legal studies, (licenci6 en droit, bachelier ou capacitaire
en droit), have worked two to three years in a barrister's, solicitor's or notary's oflice or
have exercised public functions for three years, etc. If the candidate has not had any
legal studies he still may be named a juge de paLx if he was for ten years a maire or
"adjoint" of a maire, or a "conseillier g6n6ral," or member of a commercial bourt.
The candidates for juge de paix must take a professional examination although certain
classes of candidates such as former magistrates, functionaries of the ministry of justice
of at least twenty years' service, may be named directly without examination. 1 GLAssoN
AND TissnER, TRAIT- DE PROCEDURE C=vnE (3d ed. 1925) 114-116.
11. The law which lays down the fundamental provisions for the judicial organization
is Law of Dec. 30, 1923, n. 2786, (1923) RACCOLTA UrM'CMiLE DELLE LEOE X, 8643. This
law has been modified by a number of later laws and especially by Law of Dec. 30, 1926,
n. 2219, 1927 RACCOLTA UFFnciALE I, 88 et seq. and Law of April 17, 1930, n. 421 in 1930
RACCOLTA UFMCIALE II, 1616, Law of June 5, 1933, n. 557, 19 LEx (1933) 558 et seq.
An excellent Italian book on the magistracy is PIOLA-CAsMLu, LA MA0ISTRATURA (1907);
see also 2 MAxzINi, TRATTATO Di Dmrrmo PROCCESSUALx PENALE ITALIANO (1931) 134 ct seq
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candidate, known as an "uditore," is expected to undergo a three-year
apprenticeship as an attach& to various courts and to the prosecuting
attorney's office. But the Italians permit the "uditore" to be appointed
assistant judge (vice pretore) in a petty court after his first six months of
apprenticeship.' 2 If the "uditore" wishes an appointment to the superior
courts, he must serve two years of his apprenticeship before taking the
qualifying examination, for which he must have the approval of the
Minister of Justice. In ranking candidates after the second examina-
tion, the examining board of seven high judges takes into account the
grade attained in the first examination, scholarly work done during the
apprenticeship period, the candidate's attitude towards judicial work,
his capacities and his general deportment. On the last three points the
candidate's superiors during his apprenticeship are consulted.
In the order of the rank they attain, successful candidates are ap-
pointed as associate judges (giudici aggiunti) in the trial courts of
general jurisdiction as fast as posts become vacant. The "giudice
aggiunto" has all the powers of a judge and is paid for his services.
Nevertheless the time passed as "giudice aggiunto" is considered an
experimental period during which the young magistrate may attain com-
plete maturity. Thus, he is not irremovable during good behavior as
are the titulary judges. A "giudice aggiunto" must exercise his functions
for three years before he can be named titulary judge (giudice) or a
King's prosecuting attorney (sostituto procuratore del Re).
France was for a long time remiss in providing systematic methods of
recruiting its magistrates."3 During the nineteenth century few qualifi-
cations were established for the judiciary. Candidates had to be French
citizens, twenty-two years of age or over, of good character and morals,
in possession of all civil and political rights, holders of a diploma in law,
and with at least two years' practice at the bar."4 No examination was
prescribed; no other apprenticeship was required than that which might
be had from a career of two years at the bar.
In 1876 Dufaure, a celebrated Minister of Justice, established a system
of competitive examinations and organized an apprenticeship for candi-
dates to the magistracy, but his successors dropped this system only
three years later despite its excellent results, because it interfered with
a political selection of the magistracy.'r Not until 1908 did the French
12. Such a post carries with it a small salary. In any event the "uditore," after eighteen
months' service, is entitled to six hundred lire a month (about $30.00 in gold) for the
rest of his apprenticeship period.
13. A description of present methods of recruiting magistrates will be found in Gr.sso
AND Tissim, op. cit. supra note 10, at 105 et seq.
14. Law of April 20, 1810, 1810 BuLL=-Ji nES Lois (IV ser.) pt. 12, 291.




establish the existing system of recruiting. Admission to the judiciary
is now by examination. In addition to the former qualifications, the
candidate before admission to the examination must serve an apprentice-
ship of one year as an attach6 to the Minister of Justice, or to a prose-
cuting attorney's office.' The French are therefore not so rigorous in
their requirements as either the Germans or the Italians. Only one
examination is required, not two. The apprenticeship is shorter and
does not provide so well-rounded an introduction into judicial functions.
Candidates desirous of taking the examination must address them-
selves to the Procureur de la R6publique of the jurisdiction in which
they reside, furnishing documents which establish their qualifications.
These documents are transmitted to the Procureur General of the appeal
court in the district. The Procureur G6neral and the chief justice of the
court make separate investigations of each candidate. They submit
separate reports to the Minister of Justice, the original documents of
the candidates being transmitted therewith. On the basis of these
data and opinions, the Minister of Justice determines which candidates
will be permitted to undergo the written and oral examinations de-
signed to determine whether they possess the knowledge indispensable for
the exercise of judicial functions. As a rule, successful candidates may
only be named attaches to the Minister of Justice or substitute judges
(juges suppl6ants) of the courts of first instance. 7 However, the period
which a candidate passes as a substitute judge, in contrast to the Italian
practice, is not a prolongation of the apprenticeship; the "juge suppliant"
is irremovable once he takes his oath of office.
All three countries make some exceptions to the usual methods of
recruiting the magistracy. Least liberal is Germany. A lawyer may be
named directly to exercise judicial functions, but this is hardly an ex-
ception, for lawyers have the same qualifications as candidates for the
judiciary. The only actual exception to the ordinary rules is in favor
of law professors,"8 who may be named directly without examination and
without apprenticeship. In Italy also, professors of law and lawyers
who have practised ten years may be appointed directly to judicial func-
tions. Before the appointment is made, the opinion of the superior
council of the magistracy must be obtained; the candidates are then
nanied to higher posts in the judiciary. In contrast to the Germans and
Italians, the French make many exceptions to the normal methods of
recruiting. One-sixth of all the vacancies in the magistracy in any one
year may be filled by professors and lecturers in law faculties, members
16. Decree of May 11, 1934, (1934) Las Lois NouvrLLs 457.
17. Not more than six candidates who have especially distinguished themselves In the
examinations may be named titulary judges on their first appointment.
18. GmucHTsvE=AssurOsOasETz art. 4.
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of the Conseil d'Etat, lawyers, solicitors and notaries, certain categories
of administrative officials, 9 and so forth.
Promotion
Once initiated into the magistracy the young continental judge has
ahead of him a well-defined hierarchy through whose various grades he
may hope to advance to the top. Differences in rank carry with them
differences in functions, in authority, in prestige, in dress and in salary.
Appellate and trial court judges are differentiated in this manner. But
procedure and administrative organization create demarcations in rank
within the same court. Every trial or appellate court has a chief judge
responsible for all administrative matters. Judges of every large court
are divided into sections, each of which has a chief. There are also
striking differences in status between judges performing similar functions
in different courts. Positions in courts located in large urban centers
are more desirable than those in courts located in provincial towns.
France and Italy therefore divide trial courts into three classes according
to the importance of the town in which they are located. France also
distinguishes between trial and appellate courts in the provinces and
those in Paris.
Of necessity, if the magistracy is organized as a career, the higher
ranks must be filled by the advancement of those in the lower. Young
men must be induced to enter this career by the hope of being able
progressively to better their position in life as they grow in experience
and capabilities. But advancement is not a mechanical process. Not
everybody can be promoted. The higher the rank, the fewer the posi-
tions within it. The higher the rank, the greater should be the ability
of the men occupying it. But the prizes attached to these posts inspire
the use of influence with the dispensing powers for the coveted possession.
The almost universal desire for promotion, coupled with the compara-
tively few possibilities, places great power in the hands of those who
control advancement. The promise of promotion may easily be used to
obtain a judiciary subservient to the executive authority. The first
ostensible purpose of regulating promotion is to rule out political
influence. If promotion could be made on the basis of seniority alone
there would be no room for politics. But there is no constant correla-
tion between seniority and merit. Good justice requires that the more
capable magistrates occupy the higher posts. Some discretion must be
19. These officials are the secretaries of the chief justice and the Procureur Gbnra1l of
the Cour de Cassation, functionaries in the Ministry of Justice who have the grade of
"r~dacteur," after ten years' exercise of their functions, court clerks (greffiers) who have
a diploma in law and ten years' exercise of their functions, etc. See GLisso,: Er Tissrnm,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 108.
19341
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lodged somewhere 'for the purpose of perceiving and rewarding merit.
But some regard must also be had for seniority so that every judge will
have a reasonable prospect of a career. To curb the illegitimate, and
to achieve some workable compromise between legitimate though often
conflicting claims to promotion, all three European countries have passed,
revised, and proposed anew, a multitude of statutory provisions.
Up to 1906 the Minister of Justice in France had complete discretion
in the advancement of magistrates.20 This delivered the French judi-
ciary completely into the hands of a political official. Advancement
could usually be obtained only by enlisting the support of politicians and
friends who would use their influence with the Minister of Justice.
Clemenceau, despite his sojourn in America, advocated the election of
judges as a remedy. Before the Chambre des D~put~s he gave a succinct
description of the existing situation:
"What does the Minister of Justice do when he wishes to nominate a judge?
He consults his office where he finds ...excellent recommendations from
journalists, functionaries, deputies, senators, and even of magistrates who
tend naturally to perpetuate the nepotism of their organization. A choice must
be made from among these recommendations, but how choose, how determine?
Such and such a one is the friend of such and such an influential man; one
considers it necessary to reconcile this person, assure oneself of the support
of that one; reward the services of such and such a person who recommends a
relative or friend."'21
Two decrees, one in 190622 and the other in 1908,8 tried to give some
guarantee to the judges by instituting promotion lists (tableaux d'avance-
ment) from which advancements had to be made. But these decrees still
left so large a discretion in the Minister of Justice that they did little to
check the old evils of political nepotism. Subsequent laws and decrees
and especially that of July 21, 192724 which is still in force, have been
more successful. At the present time the various positions in the courts
and in the prosecuting authorities are grouped in twelve different cate-
gories. A magistrate may be promoted only to a post in the category
immediately above his own and then only if he has attained inscription
on a tableau d'avancement after at least two years' service in his present
position.
20. Age limits were, however, fixed for the various posts in the hierarchy as follows:
25 years of age for the judges in the tribunaux, the Procureurs de la R~publique, substituts
of the Procureur Gnral and the Avocat Gnfral, 27 years for the judges in the cour
d'appel, and 30 years for the president and vice presidents of the tribunal, cour d'appel
and the Procureurs G6nraux.
21. Cited by DEH smxrN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 108-109.
22. Decree of 18 August 1906, DEHEsDn, op. cit. supra note 15, at 476 et seq.
23. Decree of 13 February 1908, DEHnEsDr, op. cit. supra note 15, at 494 et seq.
24. Decree of 21 July 1927, 1927 Smiy, Lois ET AinmEs 1107-1108.
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The preparation of the tableau d'avancement is an extremely compli-
cated process. Annually, the Chief Justice and the Procureur G~n~ral of
every court of appeal send in to the Minister of Justice a list of magis-
trates in their jurisdiction whom they deem worthy of advancement,
ranked in the order of merit. Attached to the list is a detailed report on
every magistrate recommended. Up to half the number of magistrates
in each category eligible for promotion may be listed. Magistrates not
recommended, who believe themselves unduly neglected, may address
a demand for inscription on the tableau to the Minister of Justice through
the Chief Justice and the Procureur G~n~ral of their court, who transmit
these demands along with their own opinions.
Upon the basis of these recommendations and demands for inscription,
a Commission of ten composed of the Chief Justice, Procureur G~n~ral,
four judges of the Cour de Cassation and the four directors of the Minis-
try of Justice, draws up the tableau d'avancement. Since the directors
are immediate subordinates of the Minister of Justice, he exercises a great
deal of influence in drafting the list. Formerly the Minister of Justice
had considerable discretion in making the actual promotions, for he could
choose any magistrate within a particular category, whose name appeared
on the tableau. Thus a magistrate could find his name on the tableau
every year and yet not receive promotion. The Minister's power has
however been gradually reduced by various enactments.25 By a very
recent decree, the Minister's authority in making promotions is limited
to selecting one of three names submitted to him by an elective commis-
sion of judges.2 ' This commission submits to the Minister the names of
three judges inscribed on the tableau, for every vacant post in the judicial
hierarchy.
This system of appointment does not apply to judges of the Cour de
Cassation, to the Chief Justice and Procureur G6n6ral of the Cour
d'appel, nor to the presiding justice and Procureur de la R~publique of
the Paris court (Tribunal de la Seine). For these posts, except for the
25. The tableau d'avancement was formerly valid for only one year. Every candidate
had to be reconsidered every year for inscription. Consequently, a magistrate could bL
deemed worthy of promotion one year and not appear on the lt the next. The apparent
injustice of this system won for the magistrate who has once been inscribed an automatic
reinscription on the next year's list unless the promotion commsion exprecAy decides
otherwise. Formerly also, a magistrate could be inscribed year after year and still
remain at the same post. This, too, brought such protest that it was finally arranged to
place magistrates who have been inscribed on the tableau for the longezt period at the
top of each category and to reserve for them one fourth of the available posts. This ruling
applied only to the first five ranks in the hierarchy. Decree of July 21, 1927, 1927 Sm,
Lois Lr A.uurs 1108, art. 18, 19.
26. This Commission consists of the Chief Justice of the Cour de Cassation and two
judges elected by members of this court, and a Chief Justice of an appellate and of a
trial court, elected by the judges attached to these courts.
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nominations to the Cour de Cassation," the discretion of the Minister of
Justice is unlimited. His discretion is exercised however only after con-
sultation with his colleagues in the cabinet, who always give very careful
consideration to these appointments in view of their very great political
importance.28
The advancement of magistrates in France is therefore governed by
the following conditions. First, a magistrate must spend a certain num-
ber of years in one post before he can be promoted to a higher one, and
the extent to which he can advance at any one time is limited. Second,
the esteem in which a magistrate is held by his chiefs is a significant
factor in his advancement. Third, a magistrate cannot advance unless
a promotion commission decides that he is worthy of promotion. Fourth,
the Minister of Justice who formerly had a large discretion as to advance-
ment is now limited to making his choice from three names presented to
him. Finally, inscription on the tableau gives no right to promotion
and a certain number of the most important posts are not governed by
the ordinary rules.
The Italians use methods of promotion similar in many respects to the
French, though the system as a whole is more complicated. As has been
noted, after a man has successfully passed his second examination, he
is named an associate judge (giudice aggiunto). He may then be pro-
moted to a post as a titulary judge after three years if he is recommended
by the judicial commission attached to the appeal court of his district."9
The recommendations for promotion are made as in France on the basis
of information furnished by the superiors of the associate judge. An
associate justice whom the Commission declares unworthy of promotion
may take an appeal from the decision to the superior council of the
magistracy, consisting of ten of the highest judges in Italy. If the Coun-
cil affirms the commission's finding, the associate judge is dismissed from
the service.
In contrast to the situation in France, no rules restrict the discretion of
the Minister of Justice in making appointments to the trial courts,
although the Italian, like the French, trial courts are differentiated into
three classes according to their importance. Promotions to the appellate
27. Nominations to the Cour de Cassation can only be made from among the Premier
President, Procureur G6n~ral, Conseiller d'Atat, President de Chambre or Avocat G~n6ral
prbs de la Cour d'Appel of Paris, President or Procureur de la Rtpublique of the Paris court,
director in the Ministry of Justice after five years' service If a former magis-
trate, professors of law of at least ten years' service, or lawyers of the Conseil d't-tat or
the Cour de Cassation of at least 20 years' practice, etc. Law of April 28, 1919, 1919
Bur. a ln DEs Lois 1263, art. 17 (4).
28. SHARP, THE FRExCH Crv SERvzCE (1931) 349.
29. This commission consists of the chief justice, chief prosecutor and three associate
judges of the court of appeal.
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courts, however, are minutely regulated.30 Every year a competition
(concorso) is provided for four-tenths of the expected vacancies in the
courts of appeal and for all of those in the Court of Cassation. To be
eligible for the competition for an appeal court judgeship, a man must
have had at least eighteen years' service and have received the favorable
opinion of the Judicial Council of the Court of Appeal in his district. In
the competition for the posts in the highest court of the land, the Court
of Cassation, only judges of the appeal court with at least four years'
service are eligible. Both for the appeal courts and the supreme court,
the competition takes place on the basis of "titoli," scholarly works, de-
cisions rendered, and other documents which are evidence of the candi-
date's fitness. In addition, the hierarchic superiors of the candidate are
requested to give their opinions of his work and character. For these
courts, therefore, the basis for decision on promotions is little different
from the French. The competition is judged by the superior council
of the magistracy. Successful candidates are ranked in the order of
merit, and promotion by the Minister of Justice must usually follow in
the order of ranking.
The other six-tenths of the posts in the courts of appeal which become
vacant in any one year are filled from promotion lists. These lists are
compiled by the superior council of the magistracy, not annually as in
France, but as the need arises. Seniority is a very important factor
determining inscription on these lists. Only the 150 oldest judges in
point of service can apply. Promotion usually follows in the order in
which the candidates deemed worthy of advancement are ranked.
The highest posts in the Italian hierarchy, as in the French, are
exempted from the ordinary rules. The chief justice and the presiding
judges of the various branches of the Court of Cassation, the prosecutors
attached to this court, and the chief justices of the various appellate
courts are named to their posts by royal decree after deliberation of the
Cabinet. These appointments must be made from judges of the Court
of Cassation who have had at least three years of service in that court.
This provision indicates that the Italians like the French have been
loath to eliminate entirely the influence of the executive authority in
making promotions. And this conclusion is supported by other pro-
visions which give the Minister of Justice a large discretion in the ad-
vancement of magistrates. Promotions from one class of trial courts to
another lie wholly in his hands. Even promotions to the appeal courts
need not always be made from the promotion lists in the order of rank;
for the Minister of Justice, "where the special exigencies of the service




require it, may make departures from this ranking."3 1 The judge of the
"special exigencies" which justify this step, however, is the Minister
himself. Likewise the ratings of the commission which judges the
competition are not final. They must be approved by the Minister of
Justice. The law directs that he shall give his approval to the ratings
unless there has been a violation of law in the selection.32 One would
expect that the fact that the competition is judged by the highest judges
in Italy would be sufficient guarantee of the legality of the proceedings.
But the only judge of this violation is again the Minister, and it is clear
that he can refuse to certify on this ground those magistrates who have
incurred his disfavor.
Germany has no such complex of rules and methods to fetter the
executive authority in the promotion of magistrates. The Minister of
Justice is free to advance whatever judge he pleases to any position in
the judicial hierarchy. In Wiirttemberg and Bremen and a few other
states the court in which a vacancy exists may propose a candidate, but
the government is not bound by this recommendation. In the rest of
Germany even this formality does not exist. No judge has a right to
promotion nor is there a time limit during which a judge must occupy
one post before he is eligible for another. A young "Amtsrichter" may
become the president of the Reichsgericht. Executive discretion in the
promotion of judges, however, was controlled until recently by adminis-
trative usage. No young judge at the beginning of his career was ap-
pointed to a high position in the judicial hierarchy. He usually began
as a modest "Amtsrichter" in some small court and there he remained
for a number of years before he received his first promotion. From
one to five years after his appointment he might be named as "Staatsan-
walt" (prosecuting attorney) in some court. After about ten years of
service he might become "Landgerichtsdirektor" (president of one of
the sections of the Landgericht). He might later be promoted to the
appellate court (Oberlandesgericht). The judges attached to this court
were usually men over fifty years of age. But within recent years it has
been possible for comparatively young men of requisite capacity to be
appointed to this court. What effect the new political regime in Germany
will have upon administrative usage remains to be seen.
Probably the comparative simplicity of the German arrangements for
promotion is due to the salary schedules for judges. In France and Italy
promotion to a higher post carries with it a greater salary. In Germany
an ingenious system of salaries makes concessions to seniority. If, for
instance, a judge has occupied one post for a certain number of years, he
31. Law of June 5, 1933, n. 557, 19 LEx (1933) 558, art. 9.
32. Id. art. 4 (6).
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will then begin to receive compensation equal to the initial salary of a
magistrate in the rank next above him. There is therefore less pres-
sure upon the magistrate to seek the higher post in order to better his
financial position.
The Calibre of the European Magistracy
Despite the complicated systems of recruiting and promotion, the
Europeans are not wholly satisfied with the quality of their magistracies.
Scepticism as to their competency is commonly expressed, and there is
open disbelief in their independence of the government. But there is
generally implicit faith in their honesty. The Seabury revelations which
indicated widespread venality among the judges of New York are un-
thinkable in connection with the magistracies of France, Germany and
Italy.'s An undoubted factor in maintaining high standards of honesty
is the surveillance and discipline of hierarchic superiors. Each magis-
trate is immediately answerable for his conduct to his superior and the
motives behind his decisions cannot remain concealed. In each country,
however, the magistracy has developed an "esprit de corps," a profes-
sional morality and set of traditions which is absorbed by the individual
magistrate. Whatever the explanation, the fact seems to be uncon-
tested that the magistracies of France, Germany and Italy, despite their
other faults, possess the virtue of honesty, and that the public has con-
fidence in their integrity.
The question of competency is a different matter. The public does
not seem to feel that the judiciary is as competent as it is honest. The
primary difficulty is the very large number of qualified judges required
to man the European judicial organization. Under any conditions it
would be difficult to obtain a sufficient number of competent individuals.
The Germans seem to have had the least amount of difficulty, owing to
the abnormal post war economic conditions which made the security of
judicial posts attractive. But German writers emphasize, with Dr.
Muller, that "a first class judiciary which has not alone a few outstanding
personalities but whose entire membership consists of men of the highest
calibre can not be obtained where the number of judges required is so
great." '  Of the French difficulties, Lecat writes:
33. Schiffer in his excellent book, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11, points out that after
the war, there was a noticeable degeneration in the traditionally honest German bureaucracy.
But the German judges were not included in this process despite the fact that the same
causes were operative. Although the magistracy in Germany has been reproached with
many things, nobody has dared to question its integrity. For Italy see G.ux.-rn, Scnrr
Grumici (1914) 431-432.
34. MULLER, A= UN STULNG DEs RicirTE:Rs (1929) I1 et seq.; see also Awcras,
GRUNDLIIUMr DURCHGREH'ERDER JUsTErrOR (1906) 35 et seq.
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"For many years the recruiting of magistrates has been very difficult and it
has become almost impossible today (1927). At the last examination for the
admission to the judicial career, 100 places were available but only 30 candidates
presented themselves. The insufficiency of candidates for the magistracy has
resulted in a lowering of the standards of the examination."a'8
In Italy the eminent judge D'Amelio states:
"The problem of the magistracy today (1925) is the problem of recruiting.
For some time the examinations for admission into the magistracy obtain insuffi-
cient and sometimes mortifying results. The reports of the examining com-
mission to the Ministry of Justice are full of disheartening data concerning
the scarcity of the number of those taking the competitive examinations in
relation to the number of posts available, the little or no preparation of the
candidates, their insufficient knowledge of the most elementary principles of
the law, the poorly written compositions presented, full of grammatical errors,
the incertitude and perplexity of the answers in the oral examinations. These
symptoms give the examining commission the impression that except for a few
candidates, the choices have not been very happy ones, and that the greater
part of the new magistrates are not destined to inject any new spiritual and
moral energy into the old judicial organization."30
If the judges were better paid, the Europeans could attract a better
class of candidates. In Prussia the great mass of judges and prosecuting
attorneys (slightly over 6,000) are paid from 4,400 to 8,400 marks
($1,100-$2,100)." About 240 judges are paid from 6,200 to 12,600
marks ($1,550-$3,150). Forty-two are paid 14,000 marks ($3,500)
and fifteen judges are paid from 16,000 to 22,000 marks ($4,000-
$5,050)."O In France the titulary judges of first, second, and third class
are paid respectively at the rate of 22,000 francs ($880), 28,000 francs
($1,120) and 35,000 francs ($1,400) annually.3" The judges of the
Courts of Appeal are paid 47,000 francs ($1,880) annually in the
35. LFAT, LA Rf.oRz JuDICIAcRE DE 1926 (1927) 135. SHARP, notes, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 184-185, that the recruiting of the French judiciary has noticeably declined
both in quantity and quality. During the eight year period 1919-1927, approximately
1000 vacancies occurred in the magistracy. To fill these posts only 936 candidates were
forthcoming, and naturally not all of them passed the examination. From 40 to 80%
passed at 16 examination sessions, but the average score attained was only 71 points or
barely the minimum. In 1925, moreover, only 307o of the candidates held doctor's degrees.
36. 1 LAvoRi PREPARATORI DEL CODICE PENALE E DEL CODICE DI PROCEDURA PWALE
246 (1928).
37. The dollar figures are on a gold basis.
38. These figures are for the year 1930 and are taken from HAUSHALT DER JUSTIZVElt-
WALTUNG FUR DAS REcHNUNGSJAHR 1930 (Prussia 1930) 12-14. This inferior economic
status of German magistrates is not merely the result of the war. Even before the war
there were complaints of a "Subalternisierung" of the magistracy. See Anicsax, op, Cit
supra note 34, at 7-8 and 48-49.
39. The salaries in the Paris courts are much higher than they are in the provinces,
A titulary judge is there paid 52,000 francs ($2,080.) annually.
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provinces and 62,000 francs ($2,480) in Paris. The salary range of
Italian judges is from 17,400 lire (about $870) for the lowest paid judge
to 74,000 lire ($3,700) for the highest paid judge in the hierarchy. A
New York municipal court judge receives a salary of $9,000 a year;
a Supreme Court judge of the United States receives $25,000 a year.
A judge in the English County Court is paid £1,500 annually ($7,500)
and a High Court judge £5,000 annually ($25,000).
-Another unattractive feature of the judicial career in the eyes of
capable young candidates is the prospect of having to spend a lengthy
period in small communities. All three countries have large numbers
of courts in small communities with comparatively little judicial business,
yet requiring a complete judicial personnel. Young magistrates begin
their career in these unimportant posts, where their official duties are
not enough to absorb their energies or further their education and where
other means of intellectual development are lacking. Mortara wrote of
Italy:
"The miserable conditions of the career of the inferior court judges (pretore)
are due not alone to the small salaries but also to the conditions of the organiza-
tion of the career which render impossible study and apprenticeship. Even
the finest steel, if not used for a long time, grows rusty. Similarly, the most
acute jurist left in a humble town where there is a possibility of becoming
a moron in six months, cannot retain his faculties in all their fullness and
freshness for many years and for the time when he will be called upon to use
them in more worthy positions."40
In a similar vein, Schiffer complains that the German judges
"are far from the stream of life, excluded from the fountains of intellectual
development. They may become very easily, without their fault, small and
narrow at a time when in the confusion of opinions, struggle of parties, opposi-
tion of ideas ... it is especially necessary that they perform their duties with
clear views and wide conceptions." '41
French critics sing the same tune.42
The sine qua non of improvement in all three countries is a fundamental
reform of the judicial organization which will permit a drastic reduction
in the number of judges required. The magistracy must be better paid,
and governmental budgetary difficulties will permit it, only if the number
to be paid is materially reduced. Twelve thousand German judges can-
not be remunerated at the rate at which a couple of hundred English
judges are paid. Greater financial prizes would unquestionably per-
40. Cited by D'Airmmo in 1 LAvoRi PREPARATORI DEL CODiCE Pr.NALE E DEL CODICa DI
PROCEDU RE PEmALE 247 (1928); see also, GALrNTE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 17-31;
442-443.
41. ScHmssR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 117.
42. LATr, op. cit. supra note 35, at 136.
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suade more energetic and intelligent men to choose a judicial career.
But, in addition, better monetary returns would enable the judiciary to
attract the experienced lawyers with large practices who furnish such
excellent contributions to the English judiciary. At the present time, an
experienced lawyer in France, Germany and Italy, rarely abandons his
practice for a judicial post.45 Reduction in the number of judges might
come about through the limitation of the small tribunals and concentra-
tion of the judges in larger centers, the substitution of the single judge
for the judicial college, the substitution of ambulatory for sedentary
tribunals, limitations in the number of appeals and simplification of the
procedure. If some of these reforms could be brought about, they would
ameliorate other unfavorable aspects of the judicial career.
Unfortunately the path of judicial reform is no easier in Europe than
in America. Efforts to suppress the small courts and to concentrate the
judges in a number of large centers encounter considerable resistance.
France in 1926 actually did abolish the tribunal d'arrondissement, a re-
form which had been demanded for a long time. But in 1930 practically
all these tribunals were reestablished on the insistence of the local
communities. The loss of the courts had deprived them of a certain
amount of business and prestige which they missed.
Lack of Independence of the Continental Judiciary
But neither increase in salaries nor reduction in numbers will eliminate
the fundamental vice of European judicial organization, the subserviency
of the judiciary. It does not appear from the history of the judiciary
nor from the operation of present guarantees against executive inter-
ference in justice, that an honest attempt has ever been made to free the
European judiciaries from dependence upon executive authority. It is
obvious that the party in power is always under the temptation to keep
the judiciary dependent. It is a powerful weapon for the punishment
of enemies and the reward of friends.
In France the independence of the magistracy was to some extent
assured under the "ancien r6gime" by the system of selling judicial offices
and by the hereditary nature of these offices. For the king to have
discharged the incumbent shortly after selling him the post, because of
a dispute over a decision, might have hurt the market for those offices.
Nevertheless, interference with justice and the discharge of judges were
far from unknown. After the Revolution, in every regime the principle
of independence of the magistracy was announced; in none was it re-
43. This is also due in part to the hostility of the career judges. An experienced lawyer
of many years' practice can only be appointed to one of the better posts. But these are
the prizes for the career men. No bureaucracy likes to see an outsider carry off the prizes,
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spected. Napoleon twice conducted wholesale dismissals of judges who
dissatisfied him. With the return of the Bourbons the constitutional
charter of 1814 promised a position for life to all judges appointed by
the king. The provision thus applied only to the future; before it was
made effective, the judiciary was swept clean of all opponents of the
regime. "The magistracy which the Restoration recruited from among
'party members' became very soon the instrument of its vengeance and
its hatreds," wrote Jeanvrot."1 The Constitution of the July Monarchy
repeated the promise of the 1814 charter, but the magistrates had to
take an oath of allegiance or resign from the service. Napoleon HI
eliminated 132 judges by fixing an age limit at which the Minister of
Justice might retire them. The expedient of requiring an oath of
allegiance to the Emperor and treating the failure to take it as equivalent
to resignation, removed many others whose attitude might prove ob-
structive. Nor has the Third Republic respected the principle of inde-
pendence. In 1883, as a result of a prolonged agitation against the
judiciary, a law was passed reforming the judicial organization and per-
mitting the government to eliminate 614 hostile magistrates.4
In Germany, Frederick the Great interfered frequently in the adminis-
tration of justice, not only reversing decisions rendered by his courts,
but also discharging and punishing judges who displeased him.40 In
the reactionary period during and immediately after the Napoleonic
Wars, there were many more cases of executive interference with justice.
One of the principal demands of the German liberal movement before
1848 was the establishment of legal guarantees for the independence of
the judiciary. This was obtained by specific provisions in the constitu-
tions of the German states during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The Weimar Constitution likewise included guarantees of judicial inde-
pendence to apply to all of Germany.4 7  But the present regime in Ger-
many has gone back to the traditions of an earlier day. A dependent
judiciary is helpful to the National Socialists in exterminating their
party opponents. Not only have all judges been discharged who are
unfortunate enough to have had a Jewish grandparent, but also all
judges "who, according to their prior political activity, do not provide
sufficient guarantees that they will work for the National States without
reserve ("riickhaltlos ffir den Nationalen Staat eintreten kdnnen") . s
44. JA._NvoT, LA MAGISTRATURE (1882) 181.
45. For this history, see Jnvaor, op. cit. supra note 44, at 159 et seq.; Duru n:z,
op. dt. supra note 15, at 1 et seq.
46. See Aunr, DE ENTWICRFLUNG DR RICHTEr.CamE UnA nmXozxi r (1906) 9
et seq.
47. Art. 102-104 of the VEP.ASSsUIG DES DEUTSCaDM RCuS (1919).
48. GEsmz zuR WiEDmuRmzEuG DES BEPuBr sEE TIm S, April 7, 1933, 34 Rmcns-
GEs EzBLATr 175. The only new judges who will be appointed in Germany in the future
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It is evident that no guarantees of independence are of any avail to the
judiciary immediately after a revolution when political passions are most
ruthless. Between revolutions, judges in France, Germany and Italy
have had certain guarantees which made it possible for them to resist the
undue pressure of the executive authority. The primary guarantee of a
judge is a provision making him irremovable during good behavior.
France accords this privilege from the moment a judge takes his oath
of office. In Germany, however, it applies only to the titulary judges;"
the "Gerichtsassessor," even though he may exercise judicial functions,
remains at the disposition of the government. In Italy, as in Germany,
only the titulary magistrates (giudice) are irremovable, but even they
must exercise their functions for three years before they are accorded
this indispensable guarantee of independence. ° Ostensibly, this trial
period gives the authorities opportunity to eliminate those who, in actual
practice, prove unfit for judicial functions. But there is nothing to pre-
vent interpreting as unfitness any sign of independence or any refusal to
permit executive interference with justice.
In all three countries, a judge who has been accorded a life position
cannot be deprived of his functions and salary or even temporarily sus-
pended except when he reaches the retirement age fixed by law or after
he is found guilty of breach of official duty by a special disciplinary
court. In France and Germany this court is composed of the highest
judges.5 Italy has a unique court for this purpose; it is composed of
six of the highest magistrates and six senators,5 2 named by royal decree.
It is difficult to understand why senators are included unless it is to give
the government great influence in disciplinary proceedings.
A position for life, within the limit of the retirement age, is not suffi-
cient of itself to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. A judge
are those who have "the capacity to subordinate themselves willingly and freely to National
Socialist leadership." Kerrl, in 1934 DErscniE Jus~rz 237-239. For the present it Is the
duty of every German judge to be a campaigner whose duty it is to take as the determin-
ing factor in his decisions the commands of the Fiihrer. Freisler, in 1933 Preussisce e J1u1s3,
383.
49. The very large use made of "assessors" in the German organization has been severely
criticized. It has been pointed out that this practise violates the guarantees of an inde-
pendent judiciary. The assessor is dependent upon the opinion of his superiors and upon
the government for an appointment as a permanent judge. See KAM, DER DEUTSCn.
RICHTER (1910) 73-74; AuBiN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 40.
50. Law of Dec. 30, 1923, 1923 RACCOLTA UFcAE DELE LEroE X, art. 170.
S1. The disciplinary court is, in Prussia, a special chamber of the Oberlandesgericht
(Disciplinar Senat) or the Grosse Disciplinar Senat of the Kammergericht of Berlin; in
France, it is the Court of Cassation.
52. The Senators must be named from among those who are neither lawyers nor
former magistrates. Law of Dec. 30, 1923, 1923 RACCOLTA UMCFIcI DELLE Lro. X,
art. 189.
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must also be protected from arbitrary transference from one post to
another. He cannot retain his independence if, as a result of a particular
decision, he may suddenly be sent from a large center in which he has
established himself and his family, to some isolated rural community.
France, Germany and Italy provide that a judge may be transferred
against his will only after the court competent in disciplinary cases ren-
ders a judicial decision. 3
No less important for the question of independence is the manner in
which assignments are made to the various branches of a court. If the
assignment of judges is in the hands of the Minister of Justice, he is
under the temptation of choosing judges favorable to his point of view
to sit on cases in which he is interested. In Prussia in the 60's and in
France under Napoleon III, when the Minister of Justice had this power,
the government used it principally to obtain a favorable court to hear
political cases.' As a reaction to this situation, France and Germany
have provided that the distribution of judges among the various chambers
and among the various functions should be left in the hands of the judges
themselves. In France every court makes this distribution annually
through a commission composed of the president, the vice-president and
the oldest judge, their plan being submitted to the entire tribunal for
approval. 5 Germany has a similar arrangement, except that the com-
mission does not seek the concurrence of the rest of the court.eo Italy
alone has still retained the decisive influence of the government in the
distribution of cases and of judges. An annual royal decree sets forth
the division of the courts into sections and the magistrates assigned to
each. The same decree also designates which sections are to judge civil
and which, criminal affairs. 7
The guarantees for the independence of the judiciary which have just
been examined, still leave open two avenues of influence and subserviency,
namely the power of appointment and advancement. Although in ap-
pointing judges the Minister of Justice is generally restricted to those who
have successfully passed the examination, he himself in all three coun-
tries, decides who will be permitted to take them. And the Minister
has complete discretion to determine when the successful candidates shall
be appointed titulary judges, if at all. The elaborate machinery set up
to investigate the qualifications of every candidate before he is admitted
53. Gr.ssoN AND Tissm, op. cit. supra note 10, at 124; Gmucnr~svrsu.noo;a srz
art. 8; Law of Dec. 30, 1923, 1923 RACCOLTA UrZICLE Dr= LwEr X, art. 170.
54. For Germany see Sc xEran, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26-27; for France see Boun-
CHARDON, LE MAGLST"AT (1926) 39-40.
55. GLAssoN AND Tisuxa, op. cit. supra note 10, at 205-206.
56. GncacsVExAssUNGSGEsETZ art. 63, 64, 117, 131.
57. Law of Dec. 30, 1923, 1923 RACCOLTA UMCLUX D.E LrGoa X, art. 33.
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to the examination, gives the Minister of Justice opportunity to deter-
mine, if he so desires, whether the candidate is pliable material or not.
But it is especially the power of advancement which is a menace to
judicial independence. Examples to prove this assertion may be cited
from every country. One illustration from French experience is typical.
During the regime of Napoleon III, political offenses were tried by the
6th Chamber of the Paris Correctional Court. From 1859-1867, every
judge who presided over this Court was elevated to the appellate court
after only one year of service.
The elaborate rules and mathematical calculations making adjustments
between merit and seniority, still leave considerable discretion in the
Minister of Justice. Thus the latter may still use promotion as a prize
for services rendered to the government. A German Minister of Justice,
Leonhard, remarked that so long as he had the right of advancement in
his hands, he was not concerned over the fact that judges were guaranteed
a position for life and could not be transferred against their will. The
ordinary judge does not wish to remain an "Assessor" or "Amtsrichter"
all his life in a little village or in a God-forsaken small town." Jeanvrot
wrote of France, "Thus magistrates, statesmen, publicists of all regimes
and of all opinions agree in recognizing that a position for life (inamovi-
bilit6) but with the possibility of advancement, i.e., with a hierarchic
system, is incapable of assuring the independence of the judges."00  It
is difficult for the individual judge to withstand not only the Minister of
Justice but also his judicial superiors. As one prominent French poli-
tician states, "there is no practical or efficacious means of controlling
the value of judgments made by the chiefs of a court upon their sub-
ordinates and of drawing up the 'tableau d'avancement.' It is therefore
evident that the career of a magistrate depends upon his hierarchic chiefs.
It is the decentralization of arbitrary power.""0  Italian experience also
indicates that judicial independence has an uneasy existence within a
system of promotion. Galante observes that the judicial career is the
cause of a continued agitation for promotions and for residences:
"There is nothing which disturbs the serenity of the magistrates more than
the retardation of their promotions or the failure to satisfy their demands for
transfer. . . . The magistrates seek to obtain the desired position with the
aid of deputies, friends of deputies, influential electors, or even of money. The
magistrate may remain in this demoralizing state for years and the process
begins anew with each new promotion and transfer."' 1
58. ScHER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 47.
59. JrANWvoT, op. cit. supra note 44, at 229. See also BouRCUAIOM, op. cit. Supra note
54, at 31-45; D-HSwDI,, op. dt. supra note 15, at 135 et seq.
60. Da, MoNziE, GRANDwuR nr SBRVIUnDE JuDiciAiRE 48-49.
61. GA.ANTE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 434; see also Rocco in op. cit. supra note 10.
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But the most succinct statement of all comes from the German Adickes
who observes, "It takes a long time before a judge has no more wishes
to bring to a Minister."0 2
Thus it is everywhere conceded that the prospect of promotion under-
mines the independence of the judiciary. When Napoleon introduced
the hierarchy and the promotion system into the judiciary he was using
the army as a model. By opening even the highest commands to soldiers
of the humblest social standing who proved themselves worthy, the Little
Corporal stimulated bravery, devotion to duty and all the other soldierly
attributes in the rank and file. But merit in a soldier involves, among
other things, unquestioning obedience to superiors. Decent judicial
organization, on the other hand, requires that the individual magistrate
be ready and able to act according to his own lights regardless of the
opinions and desires of his superiors. Napoleon was probably aware of
what he had done to his judicial organization. Like all dictators, he
was not interested in having a judiciary in a position to oppose him.
Unfortunately other continental governments which took the French
judicial organization as a model were only slightly less anxious than
Napoleon to preserve executive influence over the judiciary, although
they may have paid lip service to the principle of judicial independence.
A recent English student, comparing continental institutions to his own,
concludes that the large measure of judicial independence obtained in
England has been achieved "by divorcing almost all thought of promo-
tion from the judge's career." He continues, "That feature has hitherto
been too little remarked. It is, in truth, one of those happy and un-
theorized devices, stumbled on by a sort of horse-sense, in which English
constitutional history has been so strangely and fascinatingly fertile."'
The complicated statutory regulations of promotion have unques-
tionably ameliorated the worst effects of the system. They cut down
considerably the discretion of the Minister of Justice and make it pos-
sible for a capable magistrate to advance at some stage of his career
without sacrificing his professional integrity for political favor. A wholly
satisfactory solution to the promotion problem has not been found, not
because it is beyond possibility, but because no European government
has really wanted to find one. Politicians in Europe are as loath to
lose their privileges as they are in America, and a dependent judiciary is
a handy instrument. Though politics play a less admirable role in the
European judicial organization than in the English, its part is never-
theless less objectionable than in America. What politics must be played
62. AmcxEs, op. it. supra note 34, at 40. See also BncmuAm, Dsa Rxcuimn (199)
23 et seq.; KAmF, op. dt. supra note 49, at 82 et seq.
63. EN SOR, CouRTs AN JUDGES ni FrawcE, GERmtAny, ENc;r.uD (1933) 43.
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in the European judiciary must be played on the level of national politics,
and not on the level of ward politics as practised in America. Even if
the continental judiciary is tainted with politics, the earlier selective
processes have at least obtained a modicum of competence and pro-
fessional training in its members.
To condemn the promotional aspect of the continental situation is not
to condemn the whole idea of the judiciary as a career. The European
conception is attractive in that it provides orderly methods of recruiting
individuals for the performance of specified state functions. If it were
feasible for the continental countries to reduce the number of judges
to a bare minimum as in England, the English method of leaving appoint-
ment wholly to the executive, surrounding the judges with great social
prestige, giving them salaries commensurate with their position, and
selecting them from the ablest lawyers in private practise, might possibly
be better than the existing system of careerism. But England herself
pays a price for the excellencies of her small number of judges. She
pays for it in the amateur work of the unpaid justices of the peace and
in the expensiveness of litigation, occasioned in part by the fact that for
some litigation in the first instance and for all appeals the suitor must
go to the capitol. In the number of judges and the accessibility of
courts, the United States is comparable to continental countries, but it
would be rash to state that the appointive and the elective systems here
produce better results than the career system on the continent. It has
sometimes been questioned whether the career system can produce judges
having as wide an outlook, as deep a culture, as great an understanding
of social forces as the system of selecting for judgeship those who in
their private work have had a large experience with men and with
affairs. But it does not take much intimate contact with the French,
German and Italian systems to realize that there are men on the bench
in the higher courts of the three countries of whom any judiciary would
be proud. Probably this question of development is an individual mat-
ter. If the Europeans provided more incentives for capable young
men to enter upon the judicial career in the first instance and then
organized the career in such a way as to permit a development of their
faculties, they might obtain even better results than is the case at pres-
ent. So far as the lower ranks of the judiciary are concerned, the Euro-
pean method of recruiting produces a type of magistrate who compares
very favorably with inferior court judges in America and with the com-
bination of untrained justice and legally trained clerk in England. Un-
like the English lay justice, the continental inferior court judge has
been trained in the law and in judicial functions under older men. Unlike
the indispensable court clerk who assists the English lay justice, the con-
tinental inferior court judge assumes full responsibility for the eercise
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of his powers and functions. His work is watched by men who know
not less, but more law than he, and whose good opinion is important for
his future career. After a study of continental courts and a comparison
with the municipal courts in New York, the district courts of Mlassachu-
setts, and the reports on other inferior courts throughout the country,
it is almost impossible to escape the conclusion that the European
method of examination and apprenticeship is more successful in drafting
competent and honest inferior court judges than is the American method
of leaving the choice of magistrates to ward politicians.
